Concurrent Jurisdiction -- NLRB and Private Arbitration: A Pragmatic Analysis by Anderson Jr, Albeon G
Boston College Law Review
Volume 12
Issue 2 Number 2 Article 3
12-1-1970
Concurrent Jurisdiction -- NLRB and Private
Arbitration: A Pragmatic Analysis
Albeon G. Anderson Jr
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Albeon G. Anderson Jr, Concurrent Jurisdiction -- NLRB and Private Arbitration: A Pragmatic Analysis,
12 B.C.L. Rev. 179 (1970), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol12/iss2/3
CONCURRENT JURISD1CTION-NLRB AND PRIVATE
ARBITRATION: A PRAGMATIC ANALYSIS
ALBEON G. ANDERSON, JR.*
The typical collective bargaining agreement includes a grievance-
arbitration procedure through which disputes arising from the con-
tractual relationship may be resolved. This self-imposed commitment
to the private settlement of labor disputes has resulted in a system
of industrial jurisprudence by which sophisticated contractual language
is tempered by the "common law of the shop." The effectiveness of
this system is best demonstrated by the continued reliance upon it.
Nevertheless, the National Labor Relations Board,' either consciously
or unconsciously, is establishing itself as an alternative forum by tak-
ing initial jurisdiction over cases which could be resolved in a pre-
viously unutilized private forum. This policy has injected confusion
into an already complex area, and risks the creation of a new source
of hostility in the field of labor-management relations. This article will
examine the purported rationale underlying the Board's action, and
will suggest a course of conduct designed to minimize the conflict
arising out of this overlapping jurisdiction?
I. Two FORUMS--THE STATUTORY DILEMMA
The concurrent jurisdiction of an independent arbitrator who is
chosen by the parties under the terms of their labor agreement, and
the National Labor Relations Board, whose members are appointed
by the President under the terms of the National Labor Relations
Acta (hereinafter referred to as the NLRA or the Act), arises in part
because of the similarities between the scope of modern labor agree-
ments and the areas policed by the National Labor Relations Board.
Under the NLRA, the parties to a labor agreement are required to
bargain "with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment. . . ." 4 These negotiations generally result in a written
* B.A., 1964, Ohio Wesleyan University ; S.D., 1967, Northwestern University School of
Law. Member, Illinois Bar.
1 Variously referred to as the Board or the NLRB.
2 The analysis presented by this article is limited to the overlapping jurisdiction re-
sulting from the Board's authority under § 10 of the Act to process complaints based
on alleged unfair labor practices. Another area of overlapping jurisdiction is found in
cases dealing with representation and Jurisdictional disputes. Although many of the
considerations developed in this article apply with equal force in those areas, the prob-
lems associated with obtaining jurisdiction over all "necessary" parties warrant separate
consideration.
29 U.S.C. I§ 141-87 (1964).
4 "For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at
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document which embodies the agreement of the parties. Typically,
this contract includes a grievance procedure through which the parties
presumably intend to resolve disputes concerning the administration of
their agreement. 5 Although these procedures vary from agreement to
agreement, the underlying theory provides for progressively higher
steps of union-management meetings,' in the 'hope that problems
which are not solved at one step will be examined more objectively as
they move from level to level. Thus, solution of all but the most com-
pelling issues should be accomplished by the parties themselves. For
those few issues which cannot be resolved by the parties, the typical
contract provides for final and binding arbitration.? These agreements
to submit disputes to an arbitrator are enforceable under Section 301
of the NLRA, 8 and have been declared by Congress to be the favored
method of settling industrial disputes. For instance, Section 1 of the
Act declares it ". . . to be the policy of the United States to eliminate
the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of com-
merce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have
occurred by encouraging the practice and procedures of collective
bargaining . .." of which arbitration of labor disputes has been declared
to be "part and parcel."' Section 203 (d) goes on to provide that
" [f]inal adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby
declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance dis-
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment." 29 US.C. § 158(d) (1964).
tt In a recent survey of 1,717 major collective bargaining agreements (covering
7,438,400 employees), the Bureau of Labor Statistics found only 20 agreements which
did not refer to a method of resolving grievances. Each of these 20 instances involved
multi-employer agreements. See U.S. Department of Labor, Major Collective Bargaining
Agreements: Grievance Procedures, BLS Bulletin 1425-1 (1964).
6 These steps correspond roughly to the union and company hierarchies. Typically,
the first step will involve a meeting between the employee and his immediate supervisor.
If the dispute is not resolved at that step, the employee usually may appeal his case
to a higher level of management (either a department head or the plant superintendent,
depending upon the number of steps provided in the contract). If the dispute remains
unresolved after these meetings, the case may be appealed to the final step prior to
arbitration. In large corporations this step would involve a representative from the
company's headquarters staff and a representative from the international union.
7 In a subsequent analysis of the contracts referred to in note 5 supra, the Bureau
of Labor Statistics discovered that only 108 agreements (covering 266,300 out of 7,438,-
400 employees) did not make provision for grievance arbitration. See U.S. Department
of Labor, Major Collective Bargaining Agreements: Arbitration Procedures, ELS Bul-
letin 1425-6 (1966).
8 29 U.S.C. f 185 (1964). This view was ascribed to in Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
9 29 U.S.C. 151 (1964). United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navi-
gation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
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putes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing
collective-bargaining agreement . . . ." 1°
Thus, Congress has indicated its high regard for the procedure
of collective bargaining and has endorsed private settlements of dis-
putes arising under the resulting labor agreements. However, in com-
pleting the statutory scheme, Congress conferred jurisdiction' upon
the National Labor Relations Board' to prevent any person from en-
gaging in certain enumerated unfair 'labor practices.'2 Congress went
on to provide, in section 10(a), that the Board's power to deal with
unfair labor practices "shall not be affected by any other means of
adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by
agreement, law, or otherwise. . . (Emphasis added.)
Although a persuasive argument can be made that the term "agree-
ment," as used in section 10(a), was not intended to refer to collective
bargaining agreements, 14 the circuit courts have consistently enforced
decisions wherein the Board has relied upon section 10(a) as estab-
lishing a discretionary right to exercise its jurisdiction. 15 A similar
conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court in a recent non-deference
case.'° Thus for the purpose of this article it will be assumed that the
Board has authority to refuse to defer to the grievance-arbitration
procedure when, in the exercise of its discretion, it considers deference
undesirable." The ensuing analysis will, therefore, explore the factors
which should influence the Board's decision to accept or refuse initial
jurisdiction over a particular factual situation. The conclusions derived
from that examination will then be 'compared to the Board's actual
practice.
Before proceeding with this analysis, it is necessary to place the
deference problem in proper perspective. This involves not only an
examination of the current status afforded the grievance-arbitration
procedure by the Board, but also the position the courts have taken
when confronted by a similar problem of overlapping jurisdiction.
10 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1964).
11 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1964).
12 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964).
13 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964).
14 Lev and Fishman, Suggestions to Management; Arbitration v. the Labor Board,
10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 763, 770-73' (1969).
15 E.g., Morrison-Knudson Co. v. NLRB,. 418 F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1969).
10 NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357 (1969).
17 Since this problem falls within an area of administrative discretion, it is not
surprising that the courts are reluctant to substitute their judgment for that of the
agency. Consequently, the lack of court mandates on the exercise of the Board's jurisdic-
tion should not be taken as an affirmative decision on the merits of deference. But see
Abramson, NLRB Is the Sheriff, Not the Poacher, 55 A.B.A.J. 853 (1969).
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II. CURRENT STATUS OF THE PROBLEM
A. The Grievance Procedure and the Courts
The Supreme Court, by giving Section 203 (d)" of the NLRA a
broad interpretation, has in effect restrained itself and the lower courts
from construing labor agreements. In 1957, the Court held that agree-
ments to arbitrate labor disputes were specifically enforceable under
Section 301 (a) 1° of the Act." In a later case, it broadened that con-
cept and stated:
An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be
denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the
arbitration clause is not susceptible to an interpretation that
covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in
favor of coverage.... In the absence of any express provision
excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, we think
only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the
claim from arbitration can prevail, particularly where .. .
the exclusion clause is vague and the arbitration clause quite
broad.2'
In United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car
Corp.," decided the same day, the Court severely limited the scope of
review to be given to arbitration awards. The Court stated:
The refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration
award is the proper approach to arbitration under collective
bargaining agreements. The federal policy of settling labor
disputes by arbitration would be undermined if courts had the
final say on the merits of the awards....
It is the arbitrator's construction which was bargained for;
and so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns construction
of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him
because their interpretation of the contract is different from
his 28
Thus the Supreme Court has concluded that the policy expressed
by Section 203(d) of the NLRA "can be effectuated only if the means
chosen by the parties for settlement of their differences under a colIec-
18 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1964).
19 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
20 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957).
21 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582-85 (1960).
22 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
23 Id. at 596,599.
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tive bargaining agreement is given full play." 24 The Court has, there-
fore, cleared the way for such interplay by removing the possibility
that arbitrators will be second-guessed by the courts.
B. The Reaction of the Board to the Grievance Procedure
The "classic" analysis of the Board's reaction to overlapping juris-
diction has distinguished between those cases where an award is in
existence and those where no award has been rendered. This distinc-
tion is valid from an historical standpoint because the Board has
applied different standards to the two situations. The resulting cat-
egories, therefore, produce a convenient framework within which to
examine the current status of the problem.
1. The Scope of the Board's Review of Existing Arbitration Awards
In the Timken Roller Bearing Co. case,26 the Board was called
upon to consider the propriety of allowing its jurisdiction to be invoked
in the face of an existing arbitration award. The issue in that case
involved the unilateral installation of an "employees' manual." After
initially resisting arbitration on procedural grounds, the employer
agreed to arbitrate the arbitrability question. After the union advised
the American Arbitration Association that "the arbitrator selected
should determine whether or not the case is arbitrable, and if so, he
should also determine the merits of the case," 26 it filed an unfair labor
practice charge with the Board. In the meantime, the arbitrator found
the issue to be arbitrable, and rendered a decision on the merits in
favor of the employer. The Board concluded that the national labor
policy could best be served by deferring, despite the fact that it be-
lieved an unfair labor practice had been committed. While preserving
its discretionary right to refrain from deferring, the Board stated:
It is evident that the Union has concurrently utilized two
forums for the purpose of litigating the matter here in dis-
pute. Although the arbitrator, determined the issues before
him within the framework of the 1943 agreement and ex-
pressly refrained from prejudicing the rights of either party
before the Board, it would not comport with the sound ex-
ercise of our administrative discretion to permit the Union to
seek redress under the Act after having initiated arbitration
proceedings which, at the Union's request, resulted in a de-
termination upon the merits. In the interest of ending litiga-
tion and otherwise effectuating the policies of the Act, we
24 United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566 (1960).
25 70 N.L.R.B. 500, 13 L.R.R.M. 1370 (1946).
26 Id. at 501, 13 L.R.R.M. at 1374.
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shall dismiss that portion of the complaint relating to the
respondent's refusal to bargain as to the Employees' Manual."
In the now famous Spielberg case," the Board refined its approach
and articulated future guidelines for cases which involve existing
arbitration awards. The Board stated:
[T]he desirable objective of encouraging the voluntary set-
tlement of labor disputes will best be served by our recogni-
tion of the arbitrator's award . . . [where, as here] . . . the
proceedings appear to have been fair and regular, all parties
had agreed to be bound, and the decision of the arbitration
panel is not clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies
of the Act."
In a later case," the Board declared that the hearings would be con-
sidered fair and regular where
the procedures adopted meet normal standards as to suffi-
ciency, fairness, and regularity. As to these, each case must
rest on its own bottoms. Where, as here, the parties have
found that the machinery which they have created for the
amicable resolution of their disputes has adequately served
its purpose, we shall accept such a resolution absent evidence
of irregularity, collusion, or inadequate provisions for the
taking of testimony s1
The scope of the Board's review in relation to the statutory stan-
dards was explored in International Harvester Co., 32
 where the Board,
alluding to Section 203 (d) of the Act, stated that when an arbitration
award has been made the Board should
voluntarily withhold its undoubted authority to adjudicate
alleged unfair labor practice charges involving the same sub-
ject matter, unless it clearly appears that the arbitration
proceedings were tainted by fraud, collusion, unfairness, or
serious procedural irregularities or that the award was clearly
repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act."
21 Id,
28 Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955).
29 Id. at 1082, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1153.
30 Denver-Chicago Trucking Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 1416, 48 L.R.R.M. 1524 (1961). In
this particular case, the Board deferred to the decision of a joint employer-union com-
mittee over objections that testimony had been interrupted; the panel had declined to
give any reason for its decision, and no "public" member sat on the panel.
81 Id. at 1421, 48 L.R.R.M.,at 1526.
82 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 51 L.R.R.M. 1155 (1961).
33 Id. at 927, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1157.
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The Board then indicated that it would defer to the arbitration award
in this case since it was not palpably wrong. This standard was adopted
because:
To require more of the Board would mean substituting the
Board's judgment for that of the arbitrator, thereby defeat-
ing the purposes of the Act and the common goal of national
labor policy of encouraging the final adjustment of disputes,
"as part and parcel of the collective bargaining process.”"
Thus in recognizing the benefits of voluntarily arrived-at solu-
tions, the Board has indicated an intent to bold the parties to settle-
ments in which they themselves have participated." In only a very
limited number of situations will the Board disturb an existing award.
These standards are consistent with the policy of encouraging the
parties to settle their own disputes, and if adhered to, are not objec-
tionable in the sense of offering an alternative forum. At the same
time, these standards preserve in the Board powers delegated to it by
Congress.
2. No Award Issued—The Board's Propensity to Establish Itself as
an Alternative Forum
The Board's apparent propensity to defer to an existing arbitra-
tion award does not carry over into those areas where the problem
has not been decided by a neutral party. Where no award has been
rendered, the Board makes no distinction between cases which are
pending before an arbitrator" and those which were dropped or never
processed.87 It is equally disposed to intervene in each type of situation.
Interestingly, the Board has not always exhibited this lack of faith in
the parties' abilities to resolve their own disputes.
In a very early case, Consolidated Aircraft Corp.," the Board
indicated that the national labor policy would be effectuated by en-
couraging the parties to utilize their own dispute-settling forum. In
that case, the union had failed to use the grievance procedure to pro-
test the employer's unilateral action in regard to wages, overtime and
job classification. The Board first outlined its authority not to defer,
and then stated:
84 Id. at 929, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1158.
85 The reason most frequently cited for declining to give "hospitable acceptance"
to an existing arbitration award is an alleged disinclination on the part of an arbitrator
to decide the statutory issue. The validity of this argument is discussed later. See pp.
190-91 infra.
80 Eastern EL Gas & Sec. Co., 175 N.L.R.B. No. 108, 71 L.R.R.M. 1035 (1969).
87 Producers Grain Corp., 169 N.L.R.B. No. 68, 67 L.R.R.M. 1247 (1968).
88 47 N.L.R.B. 694, 12 L.R.R.M. 44 (1943).
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[I] t will not effectuate the statutory policy of "encouraging
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining" for the
Board to assume the role of policing collective contracts be-
tween employers and labor organizations by attempting to
decide whether disputes as to the meaning and administra-
tion of such contracts constitute unfair labor practices under
the Act. On the contrary, we believe that parties to collective
contracts would thereby be encouraged to abandon their
efforts to dispose of disputes under the contracts through
collective bargaining or through the settlement procedures
mutually agreed upon by them, and to remit the interpreta-
tion and administration of their contracts to the Board. We
therefore do not deem it wise to exercise our jurisdiction in
such a case, where the parties have not exhausted their rights
and remedies under the contract as to which the dispute has
arisen."
This early concern that the parties themselves try to solve disputes
arising under their labor agreements was reiterated in Hercules Motor
Corp.," where the Board considered the interaction of Section 203 (d)
of the Act and its power to police unfair labor practices. The Board
concluded:
If, instead of requiring the Union in this case to give "full
play" to the grievance procedure, we were to permit the
facilities provided by the Act to be used in avoidance of the
bargaining agreement, we would be frustrating the Act's
policy of promoting industrial stabilization through collec-
tive-bargaining agreements."
Again in 1963, 42 the Board, postponing an unfair labor practice hear-
ing, stated: "It would certainly frustrate the intent expressed by
Congress if the Board were now to permit the use of the Board's
processes to enable the parties to avoid their contractual obligations
as interpreted by the court.""
Approximately one year later, the Board shifted its emphasis and
began to decide cases which the parties had not pursued to the final
step of their grievance-arbitration procedure." In effectuating this
22 Id. at 706, 12 L.R.R.M. at 45.
40 136 N.L.R.B. 1648, 50 L.R.R.M. 1021 (1962).
41 Id. at 1652, 50 L.R.R.M. at 1023.
42 Dubo Mfg. Corp,, 142 N.L.R.B. 431, 53 L.R.R.M. 1070 (1963).
40 Id. at 432, 53 L.R.R.M. at 1070.
44 It Is interesting to note that this one-year interval had a profound effect on the
Dubo case. After requiring arbitration In the 1963 case, the Board ignored the panel's
decision and made its own factual determination. The Board found the award to be
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reversal in policy, the Board offered the following nebulous reason for
refusing to defer in a unilateral action case:
We are not unmindful of the fact that the resolution of the
unfair labor practice issue in this case has required our con-
sideration, as a subsidiary issue, of Respondent's claim that
it was impliedly authorized under the contract to take uni-
lateral action on the matters complained of—a claim we have
rejected as without merit. We may assume that this claim
gave rise to a difference over the meaning of contractual pro-
visions that might have been submitted for consideration
under the contract's arbitration procedures. Nevertheless, we
do not consider that reason enough for us to refuse either to
entertain the instant unfair labor practice proceeding, or to
provide the necessary redress for the violation found."
This trend away from deference has continued to the present. A
review of the 1968 and 1969 cases" indicates that the Board con-
sistently refuses to defer where no award has been rendered. The
only exception to this policy is the Board's handling of the Jos. Schlitz
Brewing Co. case." However, a close reading of that case reveals that
it was decided on the basis of its particular facts. Apparently, the
Board made its decision on the basis of what it considered to be a
harmonious bargaining relationship. The Board emphasized that the
union had made no claim of anti-union motivation; that the parties
had enjoyed many years of a satisfactory strike-free working rela-
tionship; and that the parties were asserting their claims in a situation
"wholly devoid of unlawful conduct or aggravated circumstances of
any kind. . . . ”48 It is submitted that such a standard—based on the
Board's visceral reaction to the manner in which the parties have
conducted their bargaining—is not a sound basis upon which the
parties can make business-oriented decisions.
Thus it becomes apparent that in deciding whether or not to defer,
the Board is applying different standards on the basis of whether or not
a particular grievance has been decided by a neutral. The inconsistency
"ambiguous" because neither of the two members agreed with the chairman on the
reasons for the decision. Dubo Mfg. Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. 1114, 57 L.R.R.M. 1111 (1964);
cf. note 30 supra.
415 Adams Dairy Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1410, 1415, 56 L.R.R.M. 1321, 1323 (1964).
40 See notes 71 and 87 infra.
47 175 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 70 L.R.R.M. 1472 (1968). A review of the cases decided
after Salle.' indicates that the Board is continuing to decide cases which could be re-
solved in the grievance-arbitration procedure. Thus, placed in historical perspective, this
case does not represent a reversal of present policy. E.g., Cello-Foil Prods. Inc., 178
N.L.R.B. No. 103, 72 L.R.R.M. 1196 (1969) ; Zenith Radio Corp., 177 N.L.R.B. No.
30, 71 L.R.R.M. 1555 (1969).
48 Jos. Schutz Brewing Co., 175 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 70 L.R.R.M. 1472, 1475 (1968).
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of these different approaches highlights the problem in this area. That
is, by deferring to an existing award, the Board acknowledges that the
national labor policy can be effectuated by these private settlements.
However, by accepting cases where the private forum remains un-
utilized, the Board is not promoting the use of that forum in the first
instance. The remainder of this article is devoted to an examination of
specific considerations which should motivate the Board to defer in
this latter situation.
III. A POLICY OF DEFERENCE
At the outset, it should be noted that even the more vocal pro-
ponents of intervention concede that they do "not propose that the
board should never defer to the grievance procedure of a con-
tract. . . 2'49 Therefore, the question to be resolved is not simply
should the Board defer, but rather, under what circumstances should
it defer. It is submitted that this question could most easily be answered
by a rebuttable' presumption in favor of deference. Several com-
pelling considerations can be offered in support of such a presumption.
A. Arguments in Favor of Deference
1. The Positive Effect of Resolving Disputes Internally
There is a therapeutic value in requiring the parties to use the
dispute-settling procedure which they themselves have established.
With external crutches removed, the parties cannot avoid the difficult
decisions inherent in resolving their disputes. Solutions which are
achieved through direct participation by the parties are more mean-
ingful to the maintenance of an effective relationship than are solutions
imposed from without.
The Board readily acknowledges that its ability to function is due
in no small part to the vast majority of relationships wherein the
parties can cope with their own problems. 5' A change in the Board's
attitude toward deference would contribute to an increase in the num-
ber of relationships that could be so characterized. In addition, if the
present deference policy continues, the Board will be faced with such
an increased caseload that its viability with respect to dispute resolu-
tion may be seriously hampered.
2. Economic Considerations
Economic considerations also favor a policy of deference. The
Board's intervention into areas where a private dispute-settling forum,
49 Abramson, NLRB Is the Sheriff, Not the Poacher, 55 A.B.A.J. 853, 857 (1969).
50 See discussion of illegal contract provisions at pp. 194-95 infra.
51 Thirtieth Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board 1-2 (1966).
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exists is, in and of itself, a misallocation of resources. While deciding
such cases, the Board's resources are diverted from cases where no
alternative forum exists. The total number of cases filed with the Board
has nearly doubled in the last ten years, with unfair labor practice
charges accounting for 58 percent of the total. 62
 It makes little sense,
therefore, to devote a considerable amount of time and money to the
initial disposition of a case where there is an alternative forum wherein
the facts could be developed and the realities of the shop environment
could be more readily applied.
In addition to restricting the Board's activities in other areas,
the present open-door policy contributes to further misallocations of
resources. Since the agency assumes the cost of prosecuting a case, it,
in effect, creates its own demand. That is, if the Board permits its
procedures to be used to decide essentially contractual matters, it is,
in effect, providing free arbitration to the charging party. The ex-
perience gained from using taxpayers' money to finance the National
Railroad Adjustment Board's grievance-settling activities should dis-
suade the National Labor Relations Board from following a similar
course of action. In the former instance, the decreased direct financial
burden on the parties has resulted in a marked decrease in the number
of cases settled at the local level. This, in turn, has resulted in a sharp
increase in the number of grievances reaching the Board." Such a
situation lends itself more to gamesmanship than it does to the pre-
vention of industrial strife.
3. Disruptive Effect of the Board's Procedures
The final consideration favoring deference concerns the effect that
non-deference may have on the parties' relationship. Whereas deference
acknowledges the respective responsibilities incumbent upon each
forum, intervention completely obviates the private forum, and can
have a disruptive effect upon collective bargaining. This result stems
from the basic differences between a system of private settlements
wherein each party participates, and the more "hostile" procedure
wherein the government is pitted against one of the parties. Several
factors, inherent in the Board's procedures, contribute to this result
and make the Board a less desirable forum.
First, an adjudication against an employer by an arbitrator whom
he had a hand in selecting is more palatable than a Board decision
which is solemnized by a formal confession of guilt posted throughout
62 U.S. Department of Labor, Handbook of Labor Statistics 1969, Bulletin No. 1630,
at 372. The other 42% is made up of representational disputes (40.1%), union-shop
de-authorizations (.5%), amendments to certifications (.6%) and unit clarifications (.8%).
62 Mangum, Grievance Procedures for Railroad Operating Employees, 15 Ind.' &
Lab. Rel. Rev. 474, 498-99 (1962).
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the employer's plant. Moreover, an employer cannot help but become
suspicious of a union's motives when he realizes that the Board has
assumed the costs of prosecuting the complaint, while the union sits by
and watches the drama unfold. "The net effect is an angry employer,
angry with the union for precipitating the charge . . . [and] angry
with the Board ..." 54
 for its complicity in the affair. Thus the parties'
reaction to the Board's decision on deferring may manifest itself in
renewed hostilities. This problem is compounded by the unwarranted
status which accompanies the mere threat of invoking the Board's
procedures in lieu of contractual remedies. An unjustified increase in
power inures to those organizations which wish to avail themselves of
the full potential of such threats.
The above discussion is not intended to be a blanket indictment
of the Board's procedures. It does, however, highlight the fact that the
deference question cannot be decided in a vacuum. In making its de-
cision, the Board must make an honest appraisal of the parties' po-
tential reaction to its procedures."
B. Arguments in Favor of Intervention—And a Rebuttal
Having examined the arguments which favor a presumption of
deference, the reasons advanced for intervention must be considered
and judged as to whether, in certain areas, they are compelling enough
to rebut the presumption. The following concerns are generally artic-
ulated by proponents of intervention.
1. An Arbitrator Might Not Consider the Unfair Labor Practice
Issue"
As noted earlier, the Board will adhere to existing arbitration
awards which comply with the Spielberg standards. Variations from
this practice are generally based on an arbitrator's alleged unwilling-
ness to decide the statutory issue. Although this problem is usually
discussed in the context of an existing award, the concern probably
underlies the Board's thinking where no award has been rendered.
Monsanto Chemical Co." and Raytheon Co." are two cases fre-
quently cited for the proposition that arbitrators might not consider
the statutory aspects of a particular case. Although the Board treated
64 Lev & Fishman, supra note 14, at 770.
05 The Board is apparently recognizing some of the problems associated with the
effect its procedures have on the parties. See, e.g., Combined Paper Mills Inc., 174
N.L.R.B. No. 71, 70 L.R.R.M. 1209 (1969), where the Board did not require the em-
ployer to post a notice of violation.
00 See p. 194 infra for a discussion of the specific manner in which the various over-
lapping issues can arise.
57 130 N.L.R.B. 1097, 47 L.R.R.M. 1451 (1961).
58 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 52 L.R.R.M. 1129 (1963).
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these cases similarly, an examination of the salient differences between
them indicates that the problem is more illusory than real.
In Monsanto, the Board did not defer to an arbitration award
which sustained a discharge allegedly prompted by the employee's
union activities. In that case, the arbitrator stated:
I have given a good deal of thought to the dilemma which
arises out of the dual jurisdiction over the essence of the
unfair labor practice charges. Because the NLRB has ex-
clusive jurisdiction in the event of a conflict, and because I
believe the case can be decided on other grounds, I have
chosen to ignore for purposes of decision the allegations
herein contained that [the employee's] Union activities
played a part in his discharge."
From the facts recited by the Board, it appears that the arbitrator
chose to ignore one whole line of defense available to the grievant.
If this were so," there would be a serious question as to whether the
award would be accepted by the courts if their review were sought.
Under the circumstances then, it was not unreasonable for the Board
to have also declined to defer. However, the relatively unique decisional
language found in Monsanto, which could understandably require in-
tervention, must be carefully distinguished from the more typical case
where the scope of an arbitrator's inquiry is in question. The Board's
handling of the Raytheon case clearly demonstrates this point.
In that case, two employees were discharged for allegedly en-
gaging in conduct which violated the contract's no-strike clause. The
parties' arbitrator found that the employees had participated in a
walk-out. The Board, citing Monsanto for the proposition that the
arbitrator did not reach the statutory issue, found that no walk-out
had occurred. Thus, in deciding this case, the Board did no more than
substitute its judgment on that factual issue. This fact distinguishes
Monsanto from Raytheon. In the former, the arbitrator had specifi-
cally declined to decide a factual question whereas in the latter, the
question had been answered; thus the Monsanto reasoning was in-
applicable. The dissenting members in Raytheon persuasively con-
tended that:
[T]he arbitrator did not resolve the matter in vacua. He
considered all the facts presented to him which would ame-
liorate the dischargees' alleged misconduct or temper their
penalty, and he took into account any circumstances which
59 130 N.L.R.B. at 1099, 47 L.R.R.M. at 1452.
00 There remains a distinct possibility that the Board made a big issue out of mere
ambiguous decisional language. If this were so, this case would then be an example of the
Board expanding its Jurisdiction and offering itself as an alternative forum.
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might indicate that the discharges were pretextual or spuri-
ous. . . .
. • . •
Moreover, the arbitrator, by virtue of his long arbitral
experience under contracts between the Company and the
Union, possessed intimate knowledge of the labor relations
setting of this particular shop and an understanding of the
relationship of the parties involved s1
There is no reason to believe that the parties and their arbitrators
will not see the real issues in a particular case, nor is there any reason
to believe that they will not explore all of the facts. The relatively
infrequent occurrence of restricted arbitration awards similar to the
one found in Monsanto does not warrant the concern of the Board
in this area as exhibited in Raytheon. The remote possibility of arbitral
non-involvement is simply not a persuasive argument against deference.
2. The Union May Not Adequately Represent an Employee
It is not difficult to create a hypothetical situation wherein the
conduct of the employee representative should be subject to close
scrutiny. For instance, a member of a dissident political faction may
feel concerned about the vigor with which his personal grievances
are being processed by members of the incumbent opposition. How-
ever, regardless of how valid his concern may be, this factor is not
relevant to the deference issue. Various independent remedies are
available for violation of an employee's right to fair representation.
The courts, both state and federal, have consistently recognized an
employee's right to be represented fairly and impartially by his bar-
gaining agent. In 1944, the Supreme Court construed the Railway
Labor Act" as imposing "upon the statutory representative of a craft
at least as exacting a duty to protect equally the interests of the mem-
bers of the craft as the Constitution imposes upon a legislature to
give equal protection to the interests of those for whom it legislates!"°g
This duty was subsequently imposed upon bargaining agents who are
certified under the National Labor Relations Act."
In 1962, the National Labor Relations Board created a new cause
of action whereby an employee could enforce his right to fair repre-
sentation within the framework of the Board's jurisdiction. In arriving
at its conclusion, the Board reasoned:
at 140 N.L.R.B. at 890, 52 L.R.R.M. at 1133.
62 45 U.S.C. {}§ 151-88 (1964).
63 Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944).
64 E.g., Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,
345 U.S. 330 (1953).
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The privilege of acting as an exclusive bargaining representa-
tive derives from Section 9 of the Act, and a union which
would occupy this statutory status must assume "the respon-
sibility to act as a genuine representative of all the employees
in the bargaining unit. . . ."
Viewing these mentioned obligations of a statutory rep-
resentative in the context of the "right" guaranteed em-
ployees by Section 7 of the Act "to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing," we are of the
opinion that Section 7 thus gives employees the right to be
free from unfair or irrelevant or invidious treatment by their
exclusive bargaining agent in matters affecting their employ-
ment. This right of employees is a statutory limitation on
statutory bargaining representatives, and we conclude that
Section 8 (b) (1)(A) of the Act accordingly prohibits labor
organizations, when acting in a statutory representative ca-
pacity, from taking action against any employee upon con-
siderations or classifications which are irrelevant, invidious
or unfair."
By taking this action, the Board has negated concerns over the costs
associated with assuring fair representation through court action. Thus,
individual employees possess a separate and distinct right to fair
representation—a right enforceable through the National Labor Re-
lations Board. There is little doubt that appropriate remedies can be
fashioned for violations of this right." The Board can, therefore,
protect individual employees by deciding the specific fair representa-
tion issue without making any determination on the underlying con-
tractual dispute.
3. The Board Enforces "Public Rights"
The public interest argument is the most elusive of the arguments
in favor of intervention and is, therefore, the most difficult with which
to deal. It is easy to say that public policy compels a certain result.
It is equally easy to accept the statement without critical examination.
The remainder of this article is devoted to an examination of specific
as Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 184-85 (1962), enf, denied, 326 F.2d 172
(2d Cir. 1963). The Miranda Fuel doctrine was upheld by the Fifth Circuit in Local
12, URW v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966). The Supreme Court has left the ques-
tion open. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
06 See Port Drum Co., 180 N.L.R.B. No. 90, 73 L.R.R.M. 1068 (1970) ; Local 485,
IUE AFL-CIO, 170 N.L.R.B. No. 121, 67 L.R.R.M. 1609 (1968). In both cases the re-
spective unions refused to process grievances on behalf of the affected employees.
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Board cases reported during 1968 and 1969, 61 in an effort to determine
whether or not some aspect of public policy required intervention.
Essentially, the issue is whether the enforcement of "private" rights
through the grievance-arbitration procedure produces results which
are contrary to or inconsistent with the "public" considerations ex-
pressed in the Act." Since different considerations apply to different
functional areas, it is necessary at this point to distinguish the various
ways by which the Board, in the exercise of its unfair labor practice
jurisdiction, may enter an area which is also subject to the parties'
labor agreement.
There are three general ways for the problem to arise. First, the
Board may be called upon to weigh the statutory validity of a par-
ticular contractual provision. In these cases, a party may assert that
the action requested of him, although mandatory under his labor agree-
ment, is in violation of the Act. In the second area, the Board may be
asked to exercise an ancillary type jurisdiction which would require it
to construe a contractual provision before it can make a determination
of the unfair labor practice charge. This situation occurs most fre-
quently where a union, in the face of an existing labor agreement,
complains that an employer has violated Section 8(a) (5) of the Act.°9
Finally, overlap may occur where the Board and an arbitrator have
jurisdiction over precisely the same question, but each allegedly applies
a different standard. Typical cases in this area involve discipline (fre-
quently discharge) for conduct which is protected by the Act.
These three categories are not necessarily exclusive. They do,
however, provide a sound basis for an examination of the public-
interest aspect of this problem.
a. Alleged Invalidity of the Contract Provision Itself. In a very
few cases, resolution of the statutory issue is a condition precedent to
meaningful contractual discussions. Such a situation arises where the
validity of the contract is dependent upon either the construction of
the National Labor Relations Act or the effect to be given to the
Board's administrative actions. A party may raise a statutory defense
to a contractual complaint and argue that the action requested of him
would cause him to violate the Act. For instance, a party may claim
that an existing contract clause, either on its face or by reason of the
87 More spedfically, those cases reported in volumes 67-72 of the Labor Relations
Reference Manual.
68 This "public" policy is expressed in 29 U.S.C. g 151 (1964) which declares it "to be
the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions
to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when
they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargain-
89 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5).
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requested construction, is violative of the Act's "hot cargo" provision."
This question should be directed to the Board.
Similarly, the validity of a party's action may be controlled by
the Board's activities in related areas. In Monsanto Chemical Co.,11
a maintenance of membership provision was found to have been "ille-
gally applied" since the incident in dispute occurred at a time "when
the Union had not yet been certified under Section 9(e) to enter into
a union security agreement, and was therefore without authority to
enforce the Union security clause."" The certification election was
held approximately two and one-half months after the petition was
received and the contract signed. Thus the validity of the contract
provision was directly dependent upon the Board's attitude toward
the retroactivity of its certification election. Such a question is best
referred to the Board in the first instance.
In the specific situations described above, it can be concluded that
the public concern, as expressed by the legislature, may not be ade-
quately represented by one of the parties to a labor agreement.
Therefore, except as an arbitrator's decision on a factual question
may tend to make the unfair labor practice issue moot, the Board's
exercise of its jurisdiction in this area is not improper. However, as indi-
cated in the following sections, legitimate fears here should not be
allowed to cloud issues in distinguishable areas.
b. Ancillary Jurisdiction—Employer Unilateral Action. The
"public interest" issue discussed in this section involves employer-
initiated action taken without first attempting to bargain with the
union as required by Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act. During 1968 and
1969, the propriety of deferring to the grievance-arbitration procedure
was discussed in nine of these cases." Except for its decision in the
Jos. Schlitz case, which was discussed earlier," the Board repeatedly
refused to defer to the parties' grievance-arbitration procedure. An
examination of the Board's handling of these cases reveals that they
involve essentially contractual issues which could be resolved in the
private forum in a manner consistent with the public interest as ex-
pressed in the Act.
70 29 U.S.C. 1158(e).
71 91 N.L.R.B. 517, 29 L.R.R.M. 1126 (1951).
72 Id. at 519, 29 L.R.R.M. at 1127.
70 Cello-Foil Prods., Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. No. 103, 72 L.R.R.M. 1196 (1969) ; Union
Carbide Corp., 178 N.L.R.B. No. 81, 72 L.R.R.M. 1150 (1969) ; Zenith Radio Corp., 177
N.L.R.B. No. 30, 71 L.R.R.M. 1555 (1969) ; Boston Edison Co., 176 N.L.R.B. No. 132,
71 L.R.R.M. 1400 (1969) ; Combined Paper Mills, Inc., 174 N.L.R.B. No. 71, 70 L.R.R.M.
1209 (1969) ; Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 175 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 70 L.R.R.M. 1472 (1968) ;
Wisconsin Southern Gas Co., 173 N.L.R.B. No. 79, 69 L.R.R.M. 1374 (1968) ; Eaton
Yale & Towne, Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. No. 73, 68 L.R.R.M. 1129 (1968); Omaha Neon Sign
Co., 170 N.L.R.B. No, 150, 68 L.R.R.M. 1585 (1968).
74 See p. 187 supra.
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In the typical case in this area, the employer, by way of his "con-
tractual" defense to the unfair labor practice charge, claims that the
issue before the Board has already been bargained over and has been
resolved under the terms of the current collective bargaining agreement.
Therefore, the resolution of the unfair labor practice issue is directly
dependent upon a contractual determination which can best be made
in a private forum. For example, in Cello-Foil Products, Inc.75 the
dispute centered around the contractual validity of the employer's uni-
lateral installation of a pressman trainee position. In sustaining the
employer's action, the Board stated: "[W]e are of the opinion that
[the employer's] interpretation of the contract is correct and that its
actions, which are permitted thereby, do not violate the Act.""
Similarly, in Boston Edison Co.," the Board construed the parties'
labor agreement as permitting a three-member committee (two mem-
bers representing the company and one representing the union) to
change the hospitalization plan's "waiting period" by equating the
words "working days" with eight hours. The Board found that the
"proper interpretation of the provisions of the Plan conferred upon
the Disablement Benefits Committee power to make the change..
and that in doing so through its two members on the Committee, [the
Employer] did not commit an unfair labor practice within the mean-
ing of Section 8(a) (1) or (5) of the Act.""
In a case decided adversely to the employer's position," the
Board found a refusal to bargain where an employer eliminated the
shipper loader position after a scale bad been installed to weigh-count
forgings. The employee who had held the position was transferred to
the existing (non-incentive) industrial truck driver position, a classi-
fication which the company believed encompassed the employee's new
responsibilities. The Trial Examiner found that, aside from a general
waiver clause, the disputed change was covered by other provisions of
the contract which permitted the employer "to reestablish a production
rate or change an incentive rated job due to a technological change
in method and equipment." 8° The Board did not articulate its reason
for reversing the Trial Examiner's finding on this contractual ques-
tion." However, the significance of the "changed methods" argument
75 178 N.L.R.B. No. 103, 72 L.R.R.M. 1196 (1969).
76 Id., 72 L.R.R.M. at 1197.
77 176 N.L.R.B. No. 132, 71 L.R.R.M. 1400 (1969).
78 Id., 71 L.R.R.M. at 1403.
76 Eaton Yale & Towne, Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. No. 73, 68 L.R.R.M. 1129 (1968).
55 Id., 68 L.R.R.M. at 1131.
81 In reversing the Trial Examiner, the majority merely indicated that ". . . we see
no basis for inferring that the Union surrendered to [the Employer] the right unilaterally
to make a sweeping change in the method of compensating employees for performing
loading functions." Id.
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and the respective roles of the two forums was not lost on the two
dissenting members of the Board who argued that:
If there is any situation in which the Board should defer
to the parties' own agreed-upon methods for resolving con-
tract disputes, this is the case. . . . [The parties have an
established bargaining history; they have a dispute involving
substantive contract interpretation, each party asserting a
reasonable claim in good faith and in a situation wholly de-
void of 8(a) (1) or other unlawful conduct; and they have
contractual grievance-arbitration procedures which Respond-
ent has urged the Union to use for resolving their dispute."
The similarity between the public and private interests in this
area is perhaps best demonstrated by the Board's handling of the
facts in Zenith Radio Corp." There the Board not only found the
employer's unilateral action (the creation of repairman positions
and the adoption of new pay classifications) permissible under the
current labor agreement, but also stated that, in its opinion, the
employer was "required to issue the disputed reclassification.' 84
(Emphasis added.) Although this gratuitous contractual decision
probably would not be binding in a subsequent arbitration proceed-
ing," it does demonstrate the extent to which the Board can become
involved with contractual matters.
Thus a review of the unilateral action cases indicates that there
is no appreciable conflict between the public and private interests. The
Board and arbitrators are pursuing essentially the same question, that
is, have the parties bargained over a particular subject—not should they
so bargain. This essentially contractual question should be resolved by
experienced arbitrators who are the most knowledgeable in the field of
interpreting and administering labor agreements. There is, after all,
nothing sinister about the unilateral act which precipitates the jurisdic-
tion of the grievance procedure (there being no provisions for de-
claratory judgments or advisory opinions in most contracts). It is an
integral part of the parties' continuing duty to bargain.
c. Discipline Cases." During 1968 and 1969, the question of
deferring to the grievance-arbitration procedure was discussed in
82 Id., 68 L.R.R.M. at 1133.
88 177 N.L.R.B. No. 30,71 L.R.R.M. 1555 (1969).
84 Id., 71 L.R.R.M. at 1558.
83 Cf, IUE v. General Elec. Co., 407 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1968), cert, denied, 395 U.S.
904 (1969).
88 The following discussion assumes that an employee has been fairly represented.
See pp. 192-93 supra.
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eleven discipline cases. The Board deferred in two" and partially
deferred in another." In all three of these instances an arbitration
award was in existence, and the Board's approach was consistent with
the previously discussed Spielberg doctrine. The Board reached the
merits of the remaining eight cases" and decided the factual issue
presented in them. In order to appreciate the significance of that fact,
and before the performance of the private forum can be properly re-
lated to the public's undisputed interest in certain kinds of discipline
cases, it is necessary to understand the effect that collective bargain-
ing and the grievance-arbitration procedure has had on industrial
discipline.
Historically, no issue has contributed more to an employee's
desire to organize than has the employer's unrestricted authority in
the area of employee discipline.
Even where there was little evidence of . . . irresponsible
behavior on the part of management, the union seeking to
organize employees often impressed upon employees the pro-
tection offered by collective bargaining against unfair disci-
plinary treatment. It is a mistake to feel that a union's
contribution is limited to periodic contract improvements; it
has a great influence on disciplinary policies and actions. This
is felt on almost a daily basis during the life of an agreement,
either because of the silent presence of the union or because
the union has been quick to prosecute grievances relating to
allegedly unfair discipline."
Considerations such as these have contributed to the fact that
most modern labor agreements provide a limitation on the exercise
of management's right to discipline." In the few instances where no
87 Eazor Express, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. No. 201, 69 L.R.R.M. 1081 (1968); W.R.
Grace & Co., 179 N.L.R.B. No. 81, 72 L.R.R.M. 1455 (1969).
88 McLean Trucking Co., 175 N.L.R.B. No. 66, 71 L.R.R.M. 1051 (1969).
80 Dresser Indus., Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. No. 51, 72 L.R.R.M. 1065 (1969); Steves
Sash and Door, Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. No. 27, 72 L.R.R.M. 1041 (1969); Eastern Ill. Gas
& Sec. Co., 175 N.L.R.B, No. 108, 71 L.R.R.M. 1035 (1969); Morrison-Knudson Co.,
173 N.L.R.B. No. 12, 69 L.R.R.M. 1232 (1968); Milne Truck Lines, 171 N.L.R.B. No. 25,
69 L.R.R.M. 1109 (1968); Evans Prods. Co., 171 N.L.R.B. No. 138, 68 L.R.R.M. 1577
(1968); John Klann Moving and Trucking Co., 170 N.L.R.B. No. 133, 67 L.R.R.M.
1585 (1968) ; Producers Grain Corp., 169 N.L.R.B. No. 68, 67 L.R.R.M. 1247 (1968).
80 S. Slichter, J. Healy and E. Livernash, The Impact of Collective Bargaining on
Management 624 (1960).
01 In a recent study of 1,697 major collective bargaining agreements in which a
grievance procedure exists, no contracts were found to exclude discharge cases. Out of
1,609 contracts which provided for arbitration, only 34 contracts limited the scope of the
arbitrator's authority in the area of discipline. Of that number, only four excluded all
disciplinary matters. The 30 remaining contracts excluded specific issues such as the
degree of discipline and probationary employees. See U.S. Department of Labor, Major
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express limitation exists, some arbitrators have implied a "just cause"
standard, reasoning that a company's unrestricted right to terminate
the employment relationship could be used to negate all substantive
provisions of the labor agreement." Consequently, in the vast majority
of contractual relationships, the parties have restricted management's
right to discipline except for "just cause." There is no reason to be-
lieve that the results achieved by this voluntarily accepted standard
would run contrary to the public interest as expressed by the Act.
Nevertheless, the Board has repeatedly demonstrated a lack of faith
in the parties' commitments.
For example, in Eastern Illinois Gas and Securities Co.," the
Board assumed jurisdiction of a case wherein an employee alleged that
he had been discharged for activities which are protected by the Act.
The discharged employee had been the self-appointed spokesman of a
group of senior employees who were protesting the assignment of
junior employees to "more desirable indoor work." Approximately one
month after these discussions took place, the employee was informed
that he had been discharged. When pressed for a reason, the com-
pany indicated that his employment was being terminated for telling
those "men that they were being treated unfairly . . . [and for his]
remark about being unconcerned if the gas lines were properly in-
stalled. . . ."" The employee admitted the former charge, but denied
the latter and filed a grievance protesting his dismissal. That grievance
was processed through the various steps and, at the time of the
Board's decision, was pending before an arbitrator who had been
selected by the parties. Nevertheless, the Board assumed jurisdiction
indicating that: "Here we do not have an issue which falls within
the special competence of an arbitrator to determine. Rather, we find
that the dispute is primarily one which calls for resolution under the
provisions of the statute which we are charged with enforcing."" In
support of this conclusion, the Board described at great length one
element of the employer's defense. The employer had reasoned that the
senior employees' request was contrary to the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement and was, therefore, not a proper subject for
presentation by anyone other than a union representative. The Board
highlighted the sophistication of the argument as follows:
It is true that under Section 9(a), the collective-bargaining
Collective Bargaining Agreements: Grievance Procedures, BLS Bulletin 1425-1 (1964)
and U.S. Department of Labor, Major Collective Bargaining Agreements: Arbitration
Procedures, BLS Bulletin 1425-6 (1966).
92 See F. Elkouri and E. Elkouri, How Arbitration Works 410-13 (1960).
93 175 N.L.R.B. No. 108, 71 L.R.R.M. 1035 (1969).
94 Id., 71 L.R.R.M. at 1036.
99 Id., 71 L.R.R.M. at 1035 n.1.
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agreement defines, the permissible area within which an em-
ployer may adjust directly with employees grievances pre-
sented by them. Thus, if a grievance poses demands which
are in conflict with the contract, an employer may lawfully
refuse to resolve the matter without the presence of a union
representative. However, it does not follow that Section 9(a)
thereby confers on an employer the right to discharge an
employee for the act of grieving. Respondent's view of the
proviso would lead to the incongruous result of, on the one
hand, granting an employee freedom to present his com-
plaints to his employer without the intervention of the bar-
gaining representative and on the other, subjecting that
employee to the peril of discharge should his complaint con-
tradict the terms of the contract."
However, in its eagerness to reach the statutory issue, the Board
lost sight of an arbitrator's function in deciding "just cause." If the
facts developed by the Board are taken as true, the issue before the
arbitrator would merely involve the propriety of firing an employee
for admittedly complaining about work assignments and allegedly
making statements which might indicate a lack of concern for his
work. (There was apparently no question raised concerning the quality
of his work.) There is no reason to believe that the arbitrator would
lose sight of that issue. To conclude otherwise is a disservice to that
profession and the parties who created the private forum.
Similarly, in Producers Grain Corp." the Board stepped in and
decided a discharge case which was pending before an arbitrator. The
issue in that case—again taking the facts developed by the Board as
true—was the validity of the discharge of an employee for failing to
bring in a doctor's note immediately upon his return from being sick.
The employee, who had six years of company service, was willing to go
home and get a note, and did, in fact, subsequently offer a note to the
employer. Other evidence developed at the hearing indicated that the
employer had been very flexible in the administration of the doctor's
excuse rule. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Board concluded
that the discharge had been based on the employee's activity as a union
organizer. It would also come as no great surprise if the arbitrator had
found that the employee had not been discharged for "just cause."
The Board simply substituted itself as a trier of fact in a case where
the parties' own forum could have been utilized.
The Board's treatment of these discipline cases indicates that, in
reality, there is no significant difference between the public's concern
96 Id., 71 L.R.R.M. at 1036.
97 169 N.L.R.B. No. 68, 67 L.R.R.M. 1247 (1968).
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and the parties' own interests as they have expressed them in their
labor agreements. The collective bargaining standard of "just cause"
will produce a result that is consistent with the country's labor policy.
Therefore, as was found to be true in the unilateral action cases, it
appears that the Board's reliance on public policy is nothing more than
a statement of a conclusion that it has decided to intervene.
CONCLUSION
At the present time, the National Labor Relations Board is apply-
ing contradictory standards in its dealings with private dispute-settling
procedures. On the one hand, the Board defers to existing arbitration
awards and tacitly admits that the statutory policy can be effec-
tuated by these settlements. On the other hand, it pursues a policy
which is not designed to encourage the use of private forums when
an award does not already exist. Surely this latter policy does not en-
courage the parties to settle their own problems.
The arguments normally advanced in support of this intervention
have been examined and have been found to be without substantial
merit. In particular, the "public interest" argument has been shown
to be based on misconceived impressions concerning the nature of the
private forum. No conflict has been shown to exist between the public
and private interests in the areas of unilateral action and employee
discipline. Settlements arrived at in the private forum were shown to
be compatible with the public interest as it is outlined in the Act.
At the same time, the pragmatic reasons which favor a policy of
deference have been examined and have been found to be compelling.
Of particular importance was the disruptive effect intervention can
have on the creation or continued existence of a viable contractual
relationship. This concern becomes more immediate when the policy of
intervention is seen in relation to the vast misallocation of resources
that it produces. By gratuitously opening this alternative forum the
Board is, in effect, creating its own demand. This action not only in-
creases the overall work load, but it also causes the Board to divert its
attention from other important areas. This burden, which is ultimately
borne by the taxpayer, is totally unjustified.
As the Board continues its policy of accepting cases which could
properly be resolved in the parties' private forum, it allows its pro-
cedures to be catalogued among the weapons to be utilized as bargain-
ing tactics. In addition, by bearing the prosecuting costs, the Board
allows labor organizations to avoid the hard decisions inherent in the
resolution of any industrial dispute. A party's motives are suspect on
both of the above counts when he invokes the Board's jurisdiction in
lieu of a forum upon which he himself agreed.
A pragmatic reading of the cases indicates that administrative in-
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tervention is not necessary where the public point of view is repre-
sented by one . of the parties in a viable alternative adversary system.
This fact, taken together with the positive contributions to be gained
by deference, leads to the conclusion that the Board should defer in
those areas where a dispute is arguably covered by the parties' labor
agreement. The rationalization that a case has been fully litigated in
the Board's procedures will become more and more available unless
the Board closes its doors to disputes which are cognizable by the
parties' agreed upon dispute-settling procedure. A presumption in favor
of deference would recognize the simple fact that a semblance of "in-
dustrial peace" can come only when the parties understand that they
must resolve their disputes themselves. "The concept of collective
bargaining—`of two powers seeking their respective goals in a free
and open market'—is a workable solution which depends on minimal
external intervention."" Only by full utilization of the private dispute-
settling procedure can this free system of collective bargaining be
preserved.
98 Abodeely, The NLRB and the Unit Clarification Petition, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1075, 1099 (1969).
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